Building a Post 9/11 Global/Local Peace-Protection System
Adapted from notes prepared initially for a
Global Action to Prevent War UN Working Group event of 12/12/2001
The international interventions of the past decade such as those in Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan raise many questions. This note asks how the international system can intervene in ways that would be helpful to the people in the crisis area, legitimate, and effective in helping to prevent terrorism and gross violations of human rights nationally and internationally. The focus is on prevention, with the idea that effective prevention requires response patterns of action that will be widely viewed as legitimate.
The note discusses criteria for intervention, two new approaches to peacekeeping and peace enforcement in times of crisis, and two new approaches to address the roots of violence:
1.Criteria for international humanitarian intervention,
2.Modalities for intervention under article 51 of the UN Charter,
3.The need for UN standing forces,
4.Giving the UN Secretary-General broad Chapter VII authority early in crisis situations,
5.Massive investment in education and basic human needs,
6.A role for INGO networks to support Global/Local Action Centers.

The Global/Local Action Centers and supporting networks would make truly humanitarian intervention possible so that UN missions with small forces but broad diplomatic powers could go into a country where the leaders or insurgents abused international law to ensure changes or arrest violators.

1.   Criteria for International Humanitarian Intervention

The most legitimate criteria for humanitarian intervention can be summarized as follows:

In Kosovo, and also in East Timor there was a clear humanitarian need for international action. In both cases earlier humanitarian intervention could have prevented extensive crimes against people and property. The impending violence that attracted international attention in Kosovo in 1998 had been anticipated for several years as the Belgrade government removed ethnic Albanian Kosovars from public employment, and much of the displaced leadership established a peaceful informal parallel civil administration, while others became new recruits into the Kosovo Liberation Army. In East Timor the efforts at intimidation of pro-independence citizens provided very clear signals that, if people were not intimidated before and during the ballot, there would be retribution after it. This was clear, and was clearly presented as a serious possibility to the UN Security Council prior to the August 1999 ballot on autonomous incorporation into Indonesia or independence. Nonetheless between the announcement of the ballot results on September 4 in New York (September 5 in Dili), and the time the Council voted to set up a multinational force under Chapter VII of the Charter (Resolution 1264, September 15, 1999), almost two-thirds of the population had fled their homes and villages to escape the murder and pillage of militia units that had opposed independence.

In Kosovo, the action taken by the international community was not only too late to have any preventive value, but it was also disproportionate and disjunctive in relation to the problems faced by the people persecuted by Serb militia and Yugoslav army personnel. The action taken by NATO was inconsistent with the stated humanitarian goals. The bombing made it easier for Milosevic to dislodge people from their homes, not harder.

The probability of achieving a positive outcome in Kosovo when the intervention took place must be assessed in relation to the goals set, whether explicit or hidden. The humanitarian goals claimed were not effectively met because of the extensive displacement and destruction of lives and property, and the ambiguous stability for Kosovo of the resulting peace. If the goal was regime change and bringing Milosevic to court, those objectives have been achieved.

In the case of East Timor, the intervention force approved by the Security Council on September 15, 1999 succeeded in mitigating a humanitarian disaster. The fact that it arrived too late to save the lives and homes of many is a result of the fact that the Security Council did not find a way to act except by a coalition of the willing led by Australia, which would not act without the agreement of Indonesia.


2.   Modalities for Intervention under Article 51 of the UN Charter

The intervention in Afghanistan was carried out on the basis of individual and collective self-defense. This is correct; the United States was attacked and was threatened with further attacks. However the question remained as to whether the methods used to authorize and establish the coalition and the means used to pursue the war on terrorism will actually reduce the number and magnitude of present and future terrorist acts. When the UN Security Council gave a green light to US plans to create a coalition of the willing, and took important steps to prevent future acts of terrorism, it did not take any responsibility for the actual conduct of the war against terrorism by the US-led coalition. Below are mentioned a few of the things that could have been done to keep a UN handle on the intervention and to increase its credibility in relation to bringing the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks to justice. Within the Chapter VII authority of the resolution of September 28, the Security Council could have:

Had these steps been taken, the legitimacy of the military action would have been greatly increased even if the main program of bombing and action by special forces of the US and the UK would have proceeded much as they did. Greater, more direct UN involvement would have been unlikely to have lead to the peaceful extradition of Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership, but it would have saved many lives had UN units been there to accept the surrender of prisoners of war; and the transition to post-conflict peace building would have been facilitated.

3.  The Need for UN Standing Forces

The idea of a UN rapid deployment force has been discussed in a number of parliaments in Europe and elsewhere. For example, U.S. House Resolution 938 of 2001 examined the ideas in the Brahimi Report (A/55/305; S/2000/809) and outlined ways to establish a UN Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force. It cited the UN report as saying that “few of the basic building blocks are in place for the United Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human and material resources required to mount any complex peace operation in the future.” It proposed establishing a UN Police and Security Force that could be quickly dispatched under the authority of the UN Security Council comprised of directly recruited volunteer personnel. In parallel, it urged UN Member States to develop regional partnerships that could call on units of national forces capable of deploying within 30 days of a Security Council decision.

While the idea that directly recruited UN volunteer employees would form the basis of the main UN peace and security standing force for rapid deployment is controversial, its creation could be worked out in a way that would overcome many of the problems of having separate national brigades. The UN force could include police units with police functions as well as military units.

4.  Giving the UN Secretary-General Broad Chapter VII Authority
    Early in Crisis Situations

Although it would require a significant change in UN culture to have such a directly recruited UN force available on call, it would be essential to arrange this if it was also understood that any Security Council resolution calling for military or police action would provide broad powers to the Secretary-General to decide on the deployments needed under each mandate without constant micro-management by the Council. In the case of East Timor, had there been such a force, the government of Indonesia would not have been able to effectively resist its being called into action when the anti-independence militias threatened the security of UN staff and the people of East Timor. The fact that Australia, the only major country that recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor when Indonesia took control of East Timor in 1975, would not act without Indonesian permission, led to the displacement of over two thirds of the people of East Timor after a large majority (78.5%) voted for independence in August 1999. This happened because the Security Council, which had never recognized Indonesian sovereignty in East Timor, could not act without Australia since it was to be the country leading the planned coalition of the willing.

Clearly the Secretary-General should himself have the capacity to protect UN missions and the people the UN mission is serving. Furthermore, the deployment of a UN standing force should come to be viewed as a normal component of any UN undertaking whenever it would be needed to ensure international peace and security within the context of a Chapter VII resolution.

In addition to the problem of waiting for Australia to wait for Indonesian permission, the UN Security Council was constrained by the fact that key permanent members were keen to give the emerging democracy of President Habibie a chance, and he was standing for reelection later in the year. If sending in a UN standing force were a normal component of any military or police action authorized by the Security Council, there would have been no insult to Indonesia implied by following standard operating procedures.

In Afghanistan, as mentioned above, it could have saved the lives of many people had there been UN units available to accept the surrender of the military troops wanting to surrender.

The credibility and legitimacy of an action authorized by the Security Council would be greatly enhanced were there such UN direct involvement to complement action by coalitions of the willing. This would be especially important at the early stages of a conflict, which is normally the time when the most can be achieved with the least violence.

One should note that the military action of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan has gained an important measure of legitimacy due to the fact that the Taliban and, especially the Arab Al Qaeda leadership, was viewed as oppressive by many Afghans. Consequently, the intervention was seen as liberation by some people in the region. Clearly, most nations that harbor terrorists do not suffer under the same weight of foreign domination as that which Al Qaeda imposed on Afghanistan. The sort of military action that was reluctantly accepted by many people in Afghanistan because it led to regime change would be less acceptable in other countries that wittingly or unwittingly harbor terrorists.

5.   Massive Investment in Education and Basic Human Needs

The roots of terrorism lie in the alienation that arises in the people who are most disenfranchised at the bottom of an undemocratic world system where military imperial power is imposed on nations that are themselves deeply undemocratic excluding their citizens from effective participation. Terrorists are recruited in countries that lack modern education and constructive opportunities, where there is a backdrop of extreme poverty and a sense of anger at insults to the nation, the religion and the culture. A major investment should be made through the system of United Nations agencies, by individual countries, and by networks of NGOs to correct this problem. All children deserve access to modern education and knowledge of the world community as well as access to food, clean water, shelter and basic health services. If this is not organized the security of the entire world is put at risk. Community development can provide the key to bringing basic services to villages and cities throughout the world in a way that engages the local people in their own development—and in their own security.

Community development would be greatly amplified if local civil society groups were proactively involved in action to do what is needed especially to implement and lobby for the fulfillment of programs that have been endorsed by their governments at UN conferences such as those on sustainable development, food security, small arms, the rights of women, etc. This is where developing Global/Local Action Centers can build solidarity among groups within a community, between such groups, and between these groups and the worldwide network of civil society organizations that address the global problems of human rights abuses, violence and poverty. The more people are engaged in taking responsibility for UN law and UN-endorsed norms the more secure they will be. The program proposed here has two parts. The first is designed to set a basis for citizen action by encouraging clusters of civil society groups worldwide, but especially in cities or villages at risk of violence, to work together on programs of action that were endorsed by their governments, such as on sustainable development, the control of small arms or the UNESCO program of education for all. Such action can be undertaken directly or by working with various levels of local, regional and national government for implementation. The second stage is to be ready and to act in a crisis to identify violations of international humanitarian law and to resist such violations and all forms of injustice. This can be done by appeals to ones own government and by engaging a network of international NGOs to assist. It can be done effectively if there is a pre-crisis pattern of community cooperation.

6.   A Role for International NGO Networks and
     Global/Local Action Centers and Networks

The idea of forging local NGO networks in support of UN norms is important as a counterweight to the power of the sorts of militias that played truly devastating roles in Kosovo and in East Timor. In many countries at risk of violence and human rights abuses, as well as many at risk from extreme poverty, there are a number of civic groups that could be mobilized to take an interest in the recommendations of various UN programs of actions. A small investment by international NGOs and foundations in cooperation with national and local NGOs throughout the world could build a new awareness of rights and opportunities, and new patterns of cooperation. By working together to pick up the challenge of various UN mandates, proactive social development work would create new bonds of solidarity among local civil society groups, and new confidence that the UN and UN-based international NGOs are there to work for them and with them to counter any threat to human rights by the state or by local militia. The idea can be spread that any such oppression can be resisted and reported to wide networks of people who can help counter violence and bring major violations to the attention of the UN Security Council.

NGOs can play a major role in this educational, civil society capacity building. They can also take the lead in monitoring human rights interests by keeping a record of violations and making this available to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights or to officials of the International Criminal Court. The role and the responsibility of individuals before international law is expanding. A major step forward is represented by the statute of the International Criminal Court that came into force in July 2002 making individuals as well as states responsible under international law, so that in cases where a state will not or cannot prevent war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, its citizens can be held responsible directly. If it is known that people are watching, potential wrong doers will be deterred. Global/Local Action groups and networks would be especially important for preventive diplomacy. By engaging in the implementation of the less controversial parts of the many Plans of Action and agreements that states have endorsed, thousands of aware citizens can be ready to prevent the importation of illicit arms, the exploitation of labor or the violation of human rights. The more people are engaged in taking responsibility for UN law and UN norms the more secure they will be and the better prepared they will be to avert potential threats and to monitor any abuses.

It is important to assess how different forms of international intervention contribute to the expectations of individuals, and the norms that affect state practice. What is done successfully in one case will become a model for the future. Rightly or wrongly, states will feel constrained to act within the precedents set. Thus each case becomes a precedent and a model for future action. The most benign form of intervention would be to send in UN Marshals to apprehend individuals who commit crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide. This could be done with almost no violence if there were strong convictions within the nation concerned that these crimes should be stopped and prevented in the future. Civil society support of UN action would be of critical value to underpin successful interventions with UN Marshals, and a pattern of such interventions would deter future violations.

We have seen that individuals and networks of non-state actors can be very powerful. A combination of high technology, lethal weapons and borderless communications means that a wide range of people and groups can act decisively to do harm. It will not always be practical to bomb the country that harbors terrorists, and such action can generate new terrorists. Modes of international action must be sought that engender relatively peaceful responses by states and also by individuals. The efficacy and legitimacy of any given intervention should be assessed in terms of its long-term impact, not just in terms of what it achieves initially. A democratic response to challenges is required from within nations by the people to uphold their own civic values and the global norms that have been endorsed by the United Nations and by most governments worldwide.